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CASE / IANA 1479 WALLET EXPOSED

IANA #1479 Wallet Exposure: The Domain Layer Matters

A reminder that wallet-drainer ecosystems still need domains, and someone still cashes those registration fees.

File 010·Wallet report·6 min read·Editorial mirror

Public record copy. Brand names withheld, public accreditation numbers preserved. If the body below says “we”, that means the original publisher, not this mirror. TER only preserves, redacts, and re-contextualizes.

The End of [REDACTED][.]com: IANA #1479 Lied to Protect a $2M Thief

After 10 years of stealing Monero private keys, the operation is destroyed. Three registrars acted within days. The fourth — IANA #1479 — contacted the scammer, believed his story, and became his press secretary.

March 27, 2026 THE ENABLERS REGISTRY Research 12 min read
[REDACTED] Investigation — IANA #1479 Exposed
Investigation overview: The fall of [REDACTED][.]com and IANA #1479's role in protecting the scammer.
$2M+
Estimated Stolen
10
Years Active
3/4
Registrars Suspended
7
IANA #1479 Lies Proven
8
Theft PHP Endpoints

What [REDACTED][.]com Actually Did

Since 2016, [REDACTED][.]com marketed itself as a free, open-source Monero wallet. Our live network capture on February 18, 2026 proved it was doing something very different: stealing private Monero view keys on every login and hijacking transactions server-side.

Monero view key exfiltration attack — laptop transmitting stolen keys to scammer's server
Screenshot 1 — The theft mechanism: every wallet login transmitted the victim's private Monero view key to the scammer's server via Base64 encoding.
Core Theft Mechanism

Not injected code — the core architecture. A session system across 8 PHP endpoints, transmitting the victim’s private view key 40+ times per session. When users sent XMR, their transaction was silently discarded (raw_tx_and_hash.raw = 0) and replaced with the scammer’s.

User opens wallet
View key exfiltrated (Base64)
TX hijacked server-side
XMR sent to scammer
8 PHP API endpoints used for view key theft — GitHub evidence repository
Screenshot 2 — The 8 PHP endpoints documented in our GitHub evidence repository. Each endpoint participates in the session_key/view_key exfiltration chain.

Six security vendors on VirusTotal flagged it as malicious. Fifteen documented victims across Trustpilot, Sitejabber, and BitcoinTalk. One victim lost 590 XMR (~$177,000) in a single theft.

VirusTotal scan showing 6 of 93 vendors flagging [REDACTED] as malicious including Fortinet Phishing detection
Screenshot 3 — VirusTotal: 6/93 vendors flagged [REDACTED] as malicious. Fortinet classified it as “Possibly phishing.”
ScamAdviser showing [REDACTED] as Very Likely Unsafe with Trust Score 1 out of 100
Screenshot 4 — ScamAdviser: Trust Score 1/100. “Very Likely Unsafe.”

Three Registrars Did Their Job

We filed identical abuse reports with all four registrars hosting [REDACTED] domains. Three acted immediately:

Three locked doors representing suspended registrars and one open door representing IANA #1479's refusal to act
Screenshot 5 — Three registrars locked the doors. IANA #1479 left theirs wide open for the scammer.

IANA #303

Suspended

India · Days to act

IANA #460

Suspended

Malaysia · Days to act

IANA #3765

DNS Dead

China · Weeks to act

IANA #1479

Refused

USA · Defended scammer

Three countries. Three independent conclusions.

India, Malaysia, China — reviewed the evidence, found fraud, suspended the domains. No questions asked.

IANA #1479 Chose a Different Path

The fourth registrar — [REDACTED] (USA) — hosting the primary domain with the most evidence and most victims — did the opposite. They contacted the scammer, believed his story, and published a public statement defending him:

IANA #1479 public statement on X Twitter defending [REDACTED] operator claiming domain was compromised
Screenshot 6 — IANA #1479's public statement on X (Twitter), March 12, 2026. Every claim in this post was false.
“Our Abuse team conducted an in-depth review into this case and it seems that domain was compromised a few months ago... After an extensive investigation, our team found evidence of the compromise not involving the registrant... The registrant is also working to get the website delisted from VT reports.”

IANA #1479, via X (Twitter)

We analyzed this statement line by line. Every claim was false.

The Operator’s Own Words

Before IANA #1479 intervened, the operator responded directly to our abuse report. His emails confirm awareness and intent:

[REDACTED] operator email response claiming this is not phishing and has been running for 8 years
Screenshot 7 — Operator's response: “This is not possibly phishing, we've been running for over 8 years.”
[REDACTED] operator email response denying theft accusations and defending data collection practices
Screenshot 8 — Operator's second response: “This is the data we need to offer the service.” The “data” was the victim's private view key.

Seven Lies, Exposed

LIE #1: “The domain was compromised”

The theft mechanism is the core architecture — 8 PHP endpoints, Base64 key exfiltration, a 5.3-year GitHub commit gap. This system was built over years, not injected in a hack.

LIE #2: “We had received no prior abuse reports”

Six VirusTotal vendors, Trustpilot complaints going back years, a BitcoinTalk warning thread, the operator banned from r/Monero in 2018. A single Google search would have shown this.

LIE #3: “Not involving the registrant”

The operator registered 4 escape domains across 4 registrars (prepaid 5-10 years each) before the investigation was published. Deleted 21+ GitHub issues. Hired developers for a captcha system. That’s not a victim — that’s an operation.

LIE #4: “They immediately took steps to reverse it”

The theft code was running in production during IANA #1479’s statement. Zero GitHub commits addressing any incident. Nothing was reversed.

LIE #5: “Working to get delisted from VirusTotal”

IANA #1479 praised the scammer for lobbying to remove Fortinet’s “Possibly phishing” detection — without removing the possibly phishing code. That’s not good faith. That’s suppressing security warnings.

LIE #6: “Is the abuse recent?”

Shifting the burden of proof to the reporter so they can close the case. The evidence was in the report. Three peer registrars didn’t need to ask.

LIE #7: “We will re-open the investigation”

“Re-open” implies it was once open. Their investigation consisted of calling the scammer and writing down what he said. That’s not an investigation — that’s dictation.

Infrastructure Evidence

Domain network diagram showing suspended [REDACTED] domains and escape domains registered before investigation
Screenshot 9 — The domain escape network: 4 domains across 4 registrars, all pointing to the same servers. Three neutralized.
URLScan results showing [REDACTED] domains resolving to same IPs across multiple TLDs
Screenshot 10 — URLScan data: all [REDACTED] domains (.com, .cc, .biz, .net, .me, .app) resolving to the same infrastructure.
GitHub evidence repository showing documented theft endpoints and network captures
Screenshot 11 — Our GitHub evidence repository with the complete network capture analysis. 109 requests, 43 view key transmissions documented in a single session.

Timeline: The Fall of [REDACTED]

2016
[REDACTED][.]com begins operation, marketing as “free open-source Monero wallet”
2018
Operator banned from r/Monero. First victim reports appear on Trustpilot
Feb 4, 2026
Escape domain [REDACTED].cc registered (8yr prepaid) — before investigation published
Feb 13, 2026
Issue #35 published — full TX hijacking mechanism exposed
Feb 18, 2026
Issue #36 — live capture: 109 requests, 43 viewkey transmissions in single session
Feb 23, 2026
[REDACTED].cc SUSPENDED (PDR). [REDACTED].biz SUSPENDED (IANA #460). Operator panic-deletes Issues #35 & #36
Feb 26, 2026
More panic: [REDACTED].net and .me registered (10yr prepaid, same IPs as suspended domains)
Mar 8, 2026
[REDACTED].net DNS DEAD (IANA #3765). 3 of 4 escape domains neutralized
Mar 2026
IANA #1479 publishes statement: “The registrant is the victim.” Helps suppress VirusTotal detections
Mar 27, 2026
Formal ICANN complaint filed (RAA Section 3.18). Evidence submitted to law enforcement. This report published.

The Verdict

IANA #1479 didn’t ignore the evidence. They read it, called the scammer, believed him, declared him innocent, and helped suppress security warnings. Then asked the researchers to prove the abuse is “recent.”

That’s not negligence. That’s a partnership.

The domain is down. The scam is over. But the fact that a US registrar chose to publicly fabricate a cover story to shield a $2M crypto thief — that is something that will follow IANA #1479 for a very long time. Their statement will be Exhibit A in every filing from this point forward.

If you vouch for the thief, you share his bill.

Evidence & Resources

Related Investigations

This investigation is based on publicly available evidence, live network captures, OSINT, public review platforms, and IANA #1479’s own verbatim public statement. No unauthorized access was performed. All findings are independently reproducible.

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